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Abstract—The emergence of emissions trading schemes has come to represent a central 
component of an increasingly fragmented climate governance landscape. Whilst market 
trading is far from uncontroversial as a climate policy tool, the presence and prolifer-
ation of emissions trading schemes raises new and challenging questions concerning 
the appropriate design of such schemes. The task of designing appropriate emissions 
trading architectures to avoid the development of conflicting norms, particularly where 
conflict could undermine the environmental integrity of such schemes, is now a fun-
damental consideration in climate governance research. This article engages with this 
concern by critically evaluating the concept of linkage before advancing a framework 
for assessing the compatibility of potential partner emissions trading schemes based on 
a series of core convergence criteria, the presence of which are considered a prerequi-
site to durable linkage. An incrementalist perspective is advanced which conceptualises 
linkage as a process, rather than a single one-time event. This article concludes that it is 
possible to construct a stable foundation for the implementation of linkages between 
emissions trading schemes based on core convergence criteria. This may provide a more 
fruitful pathway in view of the glacial progress of international negotiations to agree 
post-Kyoto binding commitments.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of emissions trading schemes has come to represent a cen-
tral component of an increasingly fragmented climate governance landscape. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that climate change policies are highly characterised 
by the use of market-based policy instruments.1 In the years since the launch of 
the European Union’s flagship carbon reduction policy, the Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), the ‘incentive, opportunity and momentum to link the EU ETS 
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1.  Marjan Peeters, ‘Inspection and Market-Based Regulation through Emissions Trading: 
The Striking Reliance on Self-Monitoring, Self-Reporting and Verification’ (2009) 2(1) 
Utrecht Law Review 177, 177.
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to other emissions trading schemes have increased dramatically’.2 The drivers 
influencing the dynamic evolution of emissions trading in the EU are multifac-
eted and have been considered elsewhere,3 whilst the ethics of emissions trad-
ing continues to remain a matter of intense debate.4 Yet the presence of carbon 
markets and their centrality in any climate governance landscape rooted in real-
ity is increasingly acknowledged as a political fact. Given this, the proliferation 
of emissions trading schemes raises new and complex questions concerning 
the appropriate design of such schemes.5 The challenge of designing appro-
priate emissions trading architectures to avoid the development of conflicting 
norms, particularly where such conflict could undermine the environmental 
integrity of such schemes, has emerged as a fundamental consideration in cli-
mate governance research and policy-making.
This article engages with this challenge and advances an incremental-
ist vision which envisages the gradual implementation of linkages between 
schemes. Orthodox conceptualisations have generally construed linkage as an 
event denoting the admissibility of allowances or credits generated from one 
scheme for compliance purposes in another linked scheme, but as Section 2 will 
demonstrate – consistent with an incrementalist perspective – linkage is better 
understood as a process rather than a single one-time event. The prospect of 
establishing linkages between the EU ETS and other emissions trading schemes 
is central to the EU’s vision of carbon trading on a global scale.6 From the earliest 
stages of emissions trading, European policy-makers have envisaged that the 
EU ETS would form a key component of a global trading framework and per-
haps even represent the ‘blueprint’ for an interconnected international system.7 
2.  MJ Mace and Jason Anderson, ‘Legal and Design Issues Arising in Linking the EU 
ETS with Existing and Emerging Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2009) 6(2) Journal for 
European Environmental and Planning Law 197, 198.
3.  Frank Convery, ‘Origins and Development of the EU ETS’ (2009) 43 Environmental 
and Resource Economics 391; Jürgen Lefevere, ‘The EU Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Allowance Trading Scheme’ in Farhana Yamin (ed), Climate Change and Carbon 
Markets: A Handbook of Emission Reduction Mechanisms (Earthscan 2005) 75; and 
Jos Delbeke, ‘The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): The Cornerstone of the EU’s 
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol’ in Jos Delbeke and colleagues (eds), EU Energy 
Law, Volume IV: Environmental Law: The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme 
(Claeys and Casteels 2006) 1.
4.  For example, see Gerd Winter, ‘The Climate Is No Commodity: Taking Stock of the 
Emissions Trading System’ (2010) 22(1) Journal of Environmental Law 1.
5.  It is important to draw a distinction between an inquiry into the appropriate design 
of emissions trading schemes and the question of the normative desirability (or oth-
erwise) of economic incentive approaches generally.
6.  Commission, ‘Towards a Comprehensive Climate Change Agreement in Copenhagen’ 
(Communication) COM (2009) 39 final.
7.  Jos Delbeke, ‘The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): The Cornerstone of the EU’s 
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol’ (2006) 1(2) European Review of Energy 
Markets 1, 13.
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Indeed, Article 25(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC explicitly encourages linkages 
with other emissions trading schemes.8
Whilst this vision is important and may ultimately prove crucial to the future 
viability of emissions trading as a climate governance tool, it is also vital that 
the environmental integrity of the EU ETS is not subordinated to political con-
siderations which could promote more expeditious progress towards a global 
trading network. Consequently, Section 3 identifies a governing rule of envi-
ronmental integrity which demands that the implementation of direct linkage 
between the EU ETS and a second scheme should not lead to fewer emissions 
reductions than if either scheme continued to operate independently. Section 
3 proceeds to develop a framework, informed by this governing rule, to assess 
the appropriateness of implementing direct linkage based on the development 
of five core convergence criteria. It is argued that the core convergence criteria 
represent fundamental design features which must be compatible to ensure 
a de minimis degree of alignment is present before implementation of direct 
linkage with the EU ETS. This approach is not without risk: stringent adherence 
to the governing rule of environmental integrity could slow progress towards 
the EU’s vision of positioning its scheme at the heart of an international trading 
framework. However, such an approach is consistent with a utilitarian under-
standing of the contribution of emissions trading to climate governance: more 
specifically, that it is possible to use the market for economic efficiency pur-
poses in an instrumentalist manner to advance climate policy goals.9 As such, 
environmental integrity must remain central to such an evolving framework and 
it is suggested that the core convergence criteria defined in this article secures 
this objective by requiring the implementation and maintenance of a sufficient 
degree of compatibility between candidate linkage schemes. Section 4 reflects 
on the diversity of architectures emerging in the sphere of climate governance 
before reconstructing this discussion in the more discrete context of emissions 
trading. A vision advocating the incremental alignment of emissions trading 
schemes is offered which is premised on a linkage by degrees model. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes that it is possible to construct a stable foundation for the 
incremental convergence of emissions trading schemes based on political and 
regulatory cooperation. Indeed, this may provide a more fruitful pathway in 
view of the glacial progress of international negotiations to agree binding car-
bon reduction commitments.
8.  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within 
the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L273/32, as 
amended, hereafter the ‘EU ETS Directive’.
9.  Eckard Rehbinder, ‘Ecological Contracts: Agreements Between Polluters and 
Local Communities’ in Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer and Declan Murphy 
(eds), Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of 
Ecological Self-Organization (John Wiley & Sons 1994) 147.
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2 Deconstructing Linkage
2.1  The Concept of Linkage
To date, the implementation of linkage between schemes has been described 
as ‘understudied’,10 whilst ‘practice on linking remains in its early stages’.11 
However, as more countries consider the adoption of emissions trading 
schemes, the concept of linkage is likely to increase in prominence. It is notable, 
for example, that over half of the parties to the Paris Agreement indicated their 
intention to use or consider the use of market-based instruments from interna-
tional, regional, or domestic schemes.12 Yet significant concerns have already 
been raised regarding the institutional design of nascent trading schemes 
beyond the EU. Sterk and Schüle have cautioned that ‘emerging systems are 
probably going to be designed very differently from the EU ETS’,13 whilst Türk 
and colleagues have observed that ‘the emergence, to date, of national and 
regional carbon markets has been characterised by a virtual absence of institu-
tional structures for the governance of trading markets across borders’.14 Given 
this, the concept of linkage – what can appropriately be considered as within 
the definition of the term and how such linkages might develop – is of partic-
ular importance.15
Traditionally the concept of linkage has been construed as denoting the 
specific context of the regulatory authority of one trading scheme allow-
ing regulated entities to use allowances (or emission reduction credits) 
generated from another scheme for the purposes of satisfying domestic 
10.  Jørgen Wettestad and Torbjørg Jevnaker, ‘The EU’s Quest for Linked Carbon 
Markets: Achievements and Challenges’ (International Studies Association Annual 
Convention, San Francisco, 3–6 April 2013) 2 <https://www.yumpu.com/en/docu-
ment/view/24270183/the-eus-quest-for-linked-carbon-markets-fridtjof-nansens-
institutt> accessed 2 May 2017.
11.  Sampo Seppänen and colleagues, Demand in a Fragmented Global Carbon Market: 
Outlook and Policy Options (Norden 2013) 56.
12.  Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?’ (2016) 110 
The American Journal of International Law 269, 307.
13.  Wolfgang Sterk and Ralf Schüle, ‘Advancing the Climate Regime through Linking 
Domestic Emission Trading Systems’ (2009) 14 Mitigation and Adaption Strategies 
for Global Change 409, 413 (emphasis added).
14.  Andreas Türk, Michael Mehling, Christian Flachsland and Wolfgang Sterk, ‘Linking 
Carbon Markets: Concepts, Case Studies and Pathways’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 341, 
342 (emphasis added).
15.  Dyck has observed that linkage is not a new concept and has ‘long been advocated 
as a way to develop global cooperation on international trade’.
  See Tyson Dyck, ‘Missing Linkages: Canada, Cap-and-Trade and the International 
Climate Architecture’ (2009) 8(1) Canadian International Lawyer 1, 13 and, for a dis-
cussion of linkage in the context of trade law, Oren Perez, ‘Multiple Regimes, Issues 
Linkage, and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the WTO’ (2005) 26(4) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 735.
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compliance obligations.16 Haite’s exposition of this classic definition provides 
that ‘two national emissions trading schemes are linked if one country’s allow-
ance can be used, directly or indirectly, by a participant in the other coun-
try’s scheme for compliance purposes’.17 More recently, however, this classic 
definition has been reconsidered. Metcalfe and Weisbach, for example, have 
expounded a particularly expansive definition of linkage which is not only 
limited to emissions trading, but instead encompasses any ‘policies that allow 
regional or national carbon regimes to interact in such a way as to narrow or 
eliminate differences in the marginal cost of abatement between different 
regions or countries’.18 Burtraw and colleagues, in a persuasive study examin-
ing pathways and modalities of linkage, have articulated a definition which 
moves beyond the orthodox understanding by ‘expand[ing] the definition 
of … linking to also describe the incremental alignment of various program 
elements across trading programs’.19 This article builds on the conceptuali-
sation offered by Burtraw and colleagues by defining core convergence cri-
teria to facilitate and guide pathways towards direct linkage. Through the 
elaboration of criteria predicated on the implementation and maintenance 
of a  sufficient degree of compatibility between potential linkage partner 
schemes, this article conceptualises linkage by degrees as a fluid and facili-
tating concept which can incrementally deepen and enhance architectures 
to govern emissions trading.
Incrementalism, in this context, emphasises the importance of gradual har-
monisation by actively ensuring that cross-scale interactions produce comple-
mentary rather than conflicting actions,20 whilst displaying a healthy scepticism 
towards the prospect of achieving the ultimate vision of a comprehensive 
and binding global climate change agreement by means of a ‘big bang’.21 
16.  This is the widely employed defi nition evident in the literature: Alexander Roßnagel, 
‘Evaluating Links Between Emissions Trading Schemes: An Analytical Framework’ 
(2008) Carbon and Climate Law Review 394; Michael Mehling and Erik Haites, 
‘Mechanisms for Linking Emissions Trading Schemes’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 169; 
Gilbert Metcalfe and David Weisbach, ‘Linking Policies When Tastes Diff er: Global 
Climate Policy in a Heterogeneous World’ (2012) 6(1) Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy 110; and Mace and Anderson (n 2).
17.  Erik Haites, ‘Harmonisation Between National and International Tradeable Permit 
Schemes: CATEP Synthesis Paper’ (2003) OECD, March 2003, 5.
18.  Metcalfe and Weisbach (n 10) 113.
19.  David Burtraw, Karen Palmer, Clayton Munnings, Paige Weber and Matt Woerman, 
‘Linking by Degrees: Incremental Alignment of Cap-and-Trade Markets’ (2013) 
Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 04/2013, 1.
20.  Oran Young, ‘Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-
Scale Interactions’ in Elinor Ostrom and colleagues (eds), The Drama of the Commons 
(National Academies Press 2002) 263, 266.
21.  As described by Bodansky and Diringer, the ‘big bang theory’ of climate treaty- 
making refers to a very rapid process of deepening obligations – whereas, more typ-
ically regimes start out quite shallow, with weak obligations, and gradually become 
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Such progress, via fragmented and multi-speed efforts, has been described, in 
a nod to American constitutionalism, as Madisonian and resulting in something 
akin to a global federalism of climate policy.22 An incrementalist approach is also 
attractive as it progresses the medium-term objective of a fully linked emissions 
trading network, whilst advancing with greater urgency the more immediate 
objective of ensuring that emerging trading schemes are not so disconnected 
so as to be incompatible with one another. 
The implementation of linkage between emissions trading schemes is nec-
essary to minimise and ideally remove the potential for conflict between such 
schemes. Linkage, however, should go further by actively nurturing comple-
mentarity between schemes. Young has emphasised that institutions can inter-
act with one another as a result of both functional interdependencies arising 
from inherent connections and strategic links arising from exercises in political 
design and management.23 In the latter sense, the contribution of linkage to 
climate governance becomes readily apparent as an exercise in political man-
agement ‘to forge connections between or among institutions intentionally in 
the interests of pursuing individual or collective goals’.24 Indeed, in the context of 
climate governance, it is difficult to overstate the importance of promoting and 
facilitating complementary interaction, particularly given that there remains ‘a 
mismatch between the apparent seriousness of the problem and our collective 
institutional response’.25
Linkage, as construed in this article, is not only outcome-oriented, but 
extends to incorporating the process by which the outcome of direct link-
age is advanced. Consequently, the typology of linkage offered in Section 2.2 
recognises that the process by which direct linkage is incrementally imple-
mented – linkage by degrees – is properly within the definition of linkage.26 This 
conceptualisation also recognises that the process of linkage ‘does not have a 
deeper over time: Daniel Bodansky and Elliot Diringer, Towards an Integrated Multi-
track Climate Framework (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2007) 13.
22.  David Victor, Joshua House and Sarah Joy, ‘A Madisonian Approach to Climate Policy’ 
(2005) 309 Science 1820, 1820.
23.  Young, ‘Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale 
Interactions’ (n 20) 264; and Oran Young, ‘Institutional Linkages in International 
Society’ (1996) 2 Global Governance 1.
24.  Young, ‘Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale 
Interactions’ (n 20) 264 (emphasis added).
25.  Stephen Gardiner, ‘Saved by Disaster? Abrupt Climate Change, Political Inertia, and 
the Possibility of an Intergenerational Arms Race’ (2009) 40(2) Journal of Social 
Philosophy 140, 143.
26.  In this context, the underlying environmental rationale for each emissions trading 
scheme, consistent with the instrumentalist philosophy emphasised at n 9 remains 
constant: the achievement of carbon emissions reductions. However, it is recognised 
that there will be some variation with respect to the level of ambition of each linked 
scheme.
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final stage [and] will be ongoing’.27 It is, for example, always open to sovereign 
jurisdictions to change their minds about climate policies and consequently 
linkage is not immutable.28 However, even after the implementation of direct 
linkage, regulatory authorities governing linked schemes will need to collab-
orate closely with one another to ensure that the schemes remain compati-
ble.29 Such regulatory dialogues are increasingly common and, in the context 
of potentially uncertain and changing climate governance circumstances, the 
maintenance of successful emissions trading linkages will require particularly 
close coordination between regulatory authorities.30 
2.2 A Typology of Linkages
Linkages, as Jaffe, Ranson and Stavins have observed, may be characterised as 
direct or indirect.31 This classic definition, now widely adopted in the literature, 
extends to secondarily classifying direct linkages as unilateral, bilateral, or mul-
tilateral. Building on this typology, it is possible to envisage a further category 
which Burtraw and colleagues have termed ‘linking by degrees’.32 Whilst this 
broader construction does not yet represent a settled definition of the concept, 
it is preferable to the orthodox understanding by providing a more nuanced 
organising framework to understand and make sense of the complex and fluid 
world of carbon emissions trading.
27.  Burtraw and colleagues (n 19) 4.
28.  William A Pizer and Andrew J Yates, ‘Terminating Links Between Emissions Trading 
Programs’ (2015) 71 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 142, 151.
29.  Drawing on the experiences of transnational regulation in the context of the fi nancial 
services sector, the EU–US Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue off ers one exam-
ple of a viable template for regularising structured dialogue and cooperation. For a 
detailed evaluation of the Transatlantic Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue, see: 
Kern Alexander, Eilís Ferran, Howell Jackson and Niamh Moloney, ‘The Transatlantic 
Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue’ (2006) 7(3) European Business Organization 
Law Review 647; and Hans-Jürgen Hellwig, ‘The Transatlantic Financial Markets 
Regulatory Dialogue’ in Klaus Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda and Harald 
Baum (eds), Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in 
Europe, Japan, and the US (Oxford University Press 2005) 188.
30.  John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) 562.
31.  Judson Jaff e, Matthew Ranson and Robert Stavins, ‘Linking Tradable Permit 
Systems: A Key Element of Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture’ 
(2009) 36 Ecology Law Quarterly 789. Whilst it is possible to construct further 
subcategories, such as ‘direct and comprehensive linking’ and ‘direct and limited 
linking’, as suggested by Roßnagel, it is not proposed to adopt such a classifi ca-
tion here. See Alexander Roßnagel, ‘Evaluating Links Between Emissions Trading 
Schemes: An Analytical Framework’ [2008] Carbon and Climate Law Review 394, 
396–97.
32.  Burtraw and colleagues (n 19).
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2.2.1 Direct Linkages
To establish a direct linkage between two systems, either one or both systems 
must accept the other’s allowances or credits as valid for compliance purposes 
in its domestic system.33 Direct linkages may, however, be distinguished by 
whether they permit trading in one or more directions.
A unilateral linkage can be said to exist in circumstances where one sys-
tem’s domestic legislation (or operating rules) provides that allowances from a 
foreign scheme are recognised for domestic compliance purposes. As a result, 
entities in one system may purchase and use allowances or credits issued under 
another system for compliance purposes, but the reverse does not apply. An 
administrator of one trading scheme could establish a unilateral link with a sec-
ond trading scheme by signalling its readiness to accept allowances or credits 
issued by that other scheme for compliance purposes. Indeed, this had previ-
ously been the case with respect to Norway, prior to that country’s full integra-
tion with the EU ETS.
During Phase I of the EU ETS, Norway accepted EU allowances for compli-
ance purposes with its domestic scheme.34 However, the EU did not reciprocate 
by accepting Norwegian allowances during the same period. In such a scenario 
we can still expect market dynamics to lead to the convergence of allowance 
prices. For example, if system A establishes a one-way link by recognising 
system B’s allowances, and system A’s allowance price is the higher of the two, 
then inter-system trading can be expected to occur until the prices of the two 
systems stabilise at an intermediate level. Similarly, if system A’s prices are lower 
to begin with, then there is no incentive for regulated entities to engage in trad-
ing.35 Price stabilisation between schemes may also function as a price cap. For 
example, in the context of the EU-Norwegian link, Norwegian firms would not 
purchase EU allowances until such time as the price of their domestic allow-
ances exceeded that of the EU allowances. The Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a  carbon-trading part-
nership of nine U.S. states, also provided for a unilateral link to the EU ETS con-
ditional on the breach of a price ceiling for RGGI allowances.36 Since the price 
ceiling has never been triggered, this ‘safety valve’ has yet to be invoked in prac-
tice, but the presence of such a provision demonstrates the diversity of direct 
linkage models.
33.  Jaff e, Ranson and Stavins (n 31) 796.
34.  Phase I of the EU ETS preceded the Kyoto ‘commitment period’ and lasted from 
2005–07.
35.  Judson Jaff e and Robert Stavins, Linking Tradable Permit Systems for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions: Opportunities, Implications, and Challenge (Analysis Group 2007) 11.
36.  Clause F(4)(a) ‘Safety Valve Trigger’, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum 
of Understanding, 20 December 2005. The presence of such a ‘safety valve trigger’, 
however, quite aside from serving as a gateway to linkage, raises more fundamental 
questions about establishing a stable long-term linkage between the RGGI and EU ETS.
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A bilateral linkage occurs when two trading schemes mutually recognise 
allowances as eligible for compliance, thereby facilitating two-way traffic 
between schemes. If more than two systems participate, such a link is more 
properly characterised as a multilateral linkage, since it permits the flow of 
allowances between multiple trading systems. The implementation of such 
bilateral or multilateral linkages necessarily involves considerable coordina-
tion to synchronise the relevant legislation and rules governing each scheme.37 
Depending on the design features of each linked schemes, a bilateral link will 
tend to harmonise the allowance prices of the linked schemes. Thus, even 
though a price variation may exist when the link is first established, rationally 
behaving operators in the scheme with the higher price would purchase allow-
ances from sellers in the lower-price scheme, a phenomenon which should 
persist until a convergence price is achieved.38 However, if multiple emissions 
trading schemes establish linkages with one another, the governance frame-
work could become much more complex. For example, as Blyth and Bosi have 
explained:
Negotiations, by definition, are about compromises, with an uncertain out-
come. Non-EU countries interested in linking their domestic trading scheme 
with the EU ETS might have an interest in being first in line in any linking nego-
tiations with the EU. Once bilateral negotiations on linking the two schemes 
and decisions have been made on eligible units and compliance regimes of 
the linked schemes, then a third country wishing to link with an ‘expanded-EU’ 
scheme might very well need to negotiate with the two parties: the EU and the 
linked country, and no longer only the EU.39
From the EU perspective, Article 12 of the EU ETS Directive provides that 
where allowances are recognised under Article 25, Member States are required 
to facilitate without restrictions the transfer of such allowances between per-
sons within the EU and persons in third countries.40 Thus, the Directive not only 
promotes the concept of linkage, but also clearly facilitates the mechanics of 
such bilateral linkages.
37.  Türk, Mehling, Flachsland and Sterk (n 19) 343.
38.  This general observation regarding the operation of a bilateral linkage on a macro 
level will conceal variations which occur at a micro level. For example, net sellers in a 
system with a low price will be better off  after a link to a system with a higher price, 
because they will, in all likelihood, benefi t from being able to sell their allowances at 
a higher equilibrium price. Consequently, net buyers in the lower price system will 
be worse off  after linking, because they will have to pay this higher converged price 
for allowances. Thus, while yielding overall cost savings, linking can create both win-
ners and losers: see Jaff e, Ranson and Stavins (n 22) 800.
39.  William Blyth and Martina Bosi, Linking Non-EU Domestic Emissions Trading Schemes 
with the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2004) 31.
40.  Article 12(1)(b) expressly permits restrictions which may be adopted pursuant to the 
Directive or otherwise contained within it.
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Whilst an integrated multilateral market, based on a series of direct linkages 
between countries could emerge as more likely following implementations of 
the Paris Agreement, indirect links are already steadily developing. In fact, most 
emerging emissions trading systems foresee linkage with the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and as such, indirect linkages between 
these schemes will develop.
2.2.2 Indirect Linkages
Indirect linkages can be said to occur when two schemes, A and B, are not 
linked to each other, but are separately linked to a third system C. As trading 
schemes continue to promote linkages to the CDM, the emergence of a web of 
mostly indirect linkages grows increasingly likely.41 Despite concerns about its 
performance, the CDM has developed a substantial constituency and is likely 
to remain a core component of any post-Paris Agreement landscape.42 In fact, it 
has been suggested that indirect linkage via an emission-reduction-credit sys-
tem such as the CDM could yet emerge as an important part – if not the key 
fulcrum – of emerging international climate governance architectures.43 Under 
the CDM, certified emission reduction credits (CERs) are awarded for voluntary 
emission reduction projects in developing countries that ratified the Protocol, 
but are not among the Annex B countries subject to the Protocol’s emission 
limitation commitments. While CERs may be used by Annex B countries to meet 
their compliance commitments, they may also be used for compliance by enti-
ties covered by other cap-and-trade systems, including emerging schemes in 
the United States.
The EU adopted Directive 2004/101/EC, which introduced a link between the 
EU ETS and the CDM.44 At that time the Commission explained that linkage with 
the CDM (and Joint Implementation, the other carbon abatement mechanism 
sanctioned under the Kyoto Protocol) would ‘not only provide a cost-effective 
means for EU-based industries to cut their emissions but also create additional 
41.  For example, the EU ETS Directive at present accommodates such a linkage. The 
Chicago Climate Change also has a link with the CDM, as does Japan. Prior to its 
absorption into the EU ETS, the Norwegian scheme was also linked with the CDM: 
see Timo Behr and Jan Martin Witte, Towards a Global Carbon Market: Potential and 
Limits of Carbon Market Integration (Global Public Policy Institute 2009) 7.
42.  UNFCCC, ‘Governments See CDM as Crucial for Paris Goals’ (8 November 2016) 
<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/paris-agreement/governments-see-cdm-as-crucial-
for-paris-goals/> accessed 2 May 2017.
43.  Jaff e, Ranson and Stavins (n 31) 803.
44.  Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 
2004 amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
project mechanisms [2004] OJ L338/18, hereafter referred to as the ‘Linking Directive’.
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incentives for businesses to invest in emission reduction projects elsewhere’.45 
In many ways the Linking Directive represents the first tentative steps towards 
expansion of the EU ETS. The CDM, though hailed as ‘a masterpiece of com-
promise’,46 has been and continues to remain a highly controversial mecha-
nism.47 The credits which are awarded to a particular project are based upon an 
estimate of how much the project reduces emissions from an agreed baseline 
level. This process essentially seeks to forecast what emissions would have been 
discharged in the absence of the particular project. For example, if an energy 
company that was planning to build a coal-fired power station, instead decides 
to construct a hydroelectric power plant, it is awarded and may then sell credits 
equal to the net difference in its emissions. It must, however, demonstrate that 
in the absence of the CDM programme it would have constructed the coal-fired 
plant. As a result, a problem of ‘additionality’ has been identified which has gen-
erated a considerable body of research and commentary focusing on the true 
value of offsetting and raising questions concerning the impact of CERs on the 
environmental integrity of emissions trading objectives.48
Whilst suspicions concerning questionable assessments of additionality and 
a convoluted articulation of sustainable development have bedevilled the func-
tioning of the CDM, there have been notable successes. Between 2002 and 2008 
the mechanism facilitated the exchange of 1.9 billion credits worth US$23 bil-
lion and, drawing on this success, van Asselt has observed that ‘it is undeniable 
45.  Commission, EU Emissions Trading: An Open Scheme Promoting Global Innovation to 
Combat Climate Change (EU Commission 2005) 3–4.
46.  Hugh Wilkins, ‘What’s New in the CDM?’ (2002) 11(2) Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 144.
47.  Some scholars suggest that since anthropogenic climate change is a global phenom-
enon, abatement should occur anywhere: see Timo Behr and Jan Witte, Towards a 
Global Carbon Market: Potential and Limits of Carbon Market Integration (Global Public 
Policy Institute 2009) 13; and Nicholas Stern, A Blueprint for a Safer Planet: How We 
Can Save the World and Create Prosperity (Vintage 2010) 162. Other scholars question 
the moral and ethical dimensions of such abatement methods: see Steff en Böhm 
and Siddhartha Dabhi (eds), Failures of Global Carbon Markets and CDM? Upsetting 
the Off set: The Political Economy of Carbon Markets (MayFlyBooks 2009).
48.  For example, Lohmann has contended that off sets assume physical equivalence 
for diverse points in the cycle of a greenhouse gas where serious non-equivalence 
prevails, whereas in reality, strong uncertainty surrounds the permanence of diff er-
ent carbon off sets. See Larry Lohmann, ‘Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on 
Climate Change, Privatisation and Power’ (2006) No 46 Development Dialogue, 251.
  Michaelowa has observed that whilst most assessments of the CDM are ‘gener-
ally based on the premise that carbon markets are an innovative instrument with 
some teething troubles that can be overcome relatively easily’, Lohmann’s thesis 
instead represents a current of market critique based on ‘a principled, anti-capitalist 
stance’. See Axel Michaelowa, ‘Review: Failures of Global Carbon Markets and CDM? 
Upsetting the Off set: The Political Economy of Carbon Markets’ (2011) 11 Climate 
Policy 839.
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that [the CDM] has clearly contributed to expanding low carbon investments in 
developing countries’.49 Moreover, the market-based nature of the mechanism 
has facilitated the identification of low-cost emission reduction opportunities, 
so-called ‘low hanging fruit’, which – without the financial incentivisation pro-
vided by the CDM – may otherwise have been overlooked. The CDM has broad-
ened and deepened experience with economic instruments and contributed to 
building a consensus favouring a long-term role for market-based instruments 
in climate governance. Given this context, it is reasonable to anticipate that the 
mechanism will endure in the landscape emerging from the Paris Agreement.50
2.2.3 Linkage by Degrees
Burtraw and colleagues have described linkage by degrees as ‘the practice of 
incrementally aligning key program elements of cap-and-trade programs prior 
to the potential introduction of formal linking enabling the exchange of allow-
ances or offsets’.51 Such an approach recognises that a global carbon market is 
likely to occur incrementally in a staged process.52 This perspective challenges 
the orthodox position that a global trading architecture can only be framed 
via multilateral climate negotiations and the contrary but equally implausible 
perspective that the ‘quest to build inclusive trading markets’ should be entirely 
abandoned in favour of short-term political deals.53 As such, linkage by degrees 
represents a via media between the Scylla of investing excessive energies in 
a flailing multilateral negotiation process and the Charybdis of atomised and 
potentially conflictive climate governance initiatives. An incrementalist per-
spective instead recognises that domestic policies must be embedded within 
a broader international vision. Moreover, the contours of such an approach are 
49.  Harro van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance: Consequences and 
Management of Regime Interactions (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 20.
50.  For a further discussion of the CDM and the potential future of the mechanism 
under the provisions of the Paris Agreement, see Gerard Kelly, ‘Assessing the Climate 
Governance Contribution and Future of the Clean Development Mechanism’ (2018) 
Nordic Journal of International Law (forthcoming).
51.  Burtraw and colleagues (n 19) 9.
52.  As Betsill and Hoff mann have observed: ‘Instead of a top-down approach situated 
in the multilateral treaty regime, it is more likely that a global system will emerge, as 
cap and trade systems in diff erent policy venues are linked to one another so that 
permits can be traded across systems.’ See Michele Betsill and Matthew Hoff mann, 
‘The Contours of “Cap and Trade”: The Evolution of Emissions Trading Systems for 
Greenhouse Gases’ (2011) 28(1) Review of Policy Research 83, 100.
  This is consistent with the perspective of Türk, Mehling, Flachsland and Sterk, 
who have suggested that the emergence of a global carbon market is ‘likely to 
occur through an evolutionary process of market integration’. See Türk, Mehling, 
Flachsland and Sterk (n 19) 355.
53.  Thomas Heller, ‘Climate Change: Designing an Eff ective Response’ in Ernesto Zedillo 
(ed), Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto (Brookings Institution 2007) 115, 140.
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already evident in practice with the EU Commission recognising that it should 
actively promote wider participation by helping interested developing coun-
tries gain practical experience in emissions trading.54
Linkage by degrees provides a process by which design features of emerg-
ing schemes may be pre-emptively synchronised or later gradually reconciled 
where potentially conflictive differences could otherwise emerge. Such an 
approach emphasises the fundamental importance of ensuring that, as emis-
sions trading schemes emerge, ‘considerable efforts are made in all directions 
to prioritise linking in the future’.55 It should be recalled that the challenge is not 
to construct perfectly identical emissions trading schemes, but rather to facil-
itate alignments representing the de minimis degree of alignment necessary 
before the implementation of direct linkage.56 Compatibility, not identity, is the 
crucial touchstone. Such an approach does not put a premium on the lowest 
common denominator, but rather seeks to construct a global framework incre-
mentally by degrees. Nor does it seek to limit the degree of convergence which 
may conceivably occur. Whilst the objective of establishing a global carbon 
trading architecture via a universal and comprehensive treaty should not be 
disregarded and the certainty offered by the binding force of such an approach 
is attractive, Hoffmann’s observation that the future of multilateral negotiations 
‘appears dim’ provides a salutary warning against misplaced confidence and 
excessive policy-making energies in constructing such a pathway.57 Instead, an 
incremental approach focusing on ‘finding common ground on which to link 
[schemes] is likely to both supplement and support international climate pol-
icy’.58 Assessing opportunities for incremental alignment between emissions 
trading schemes should identify what might be considered as ‘low-hanging 
design features’: those features which represent administratively straightfor-
ward opportunities for harmonisation. As such, linkage by degrees enables 
multi-speed efforts towards deepening complementarity and ensures that 
progress is not held hostage by the failure to secure a more comprehensive 
direct linkage agreement. Such incremental steps may also generate momen-
tum for enhanced coordination. 
3 Establishing Core Convergence Criteria for Direct Linkage
The concept of linkage has now emerged as a central theme in the gover-
nance of emissions trading. Indeed, from the earliest stages of exploring the 
54.  Commission, ‘Towards a Comprehensive Climate Change Agreement in Copenhagen’ 
(n 6).
55.  Alyssa Gilbert, ‘Linking Carbon Markets: The Climate Change Silver Bullet?’ (2009) 
20(6) Energy and Environment 901, 920.
56.  Burtraw and colleagues (n 19) 10.
57.  Matthew Hoff mann, ‘Global Climate Change’ in Robert Falkner (ed), The Handbook of 
Global Climate and Environment Policy (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2013) 3, 11.
58.  Gilbert (n 55) 925.
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potential contribution of emissions trading to climate governance in the EU, it 
was evident that the international dimension was highly relevant. Yet whilst the 
EU has actively promoted its model of emissions trading, there has to date been 
little substantive synchronisation of the EU ETS with other emerging regional 
trading schemes. The notable exception to this has been the full integration of 
EFTA Member States with the EU ETS. This development is not entirely surpris-
ing given the pre-existing heightened culture of harmonisation between the 
EU and EFTA Member States across a number of competences.59 Instead, the 
key challenge lies in assessing how the modalities of linking the EU ETS with 
other regional emissions trading schemes could be achieved in the absence of 
such a developed harmonisation culture. Fundamental to this task is an evalu-
ation of the design features which constitute core convergence criteria and the 
challenges of translating negotiated linking compromises into legally viable 
and durable arrangements. 
3.1 The Necessity for Core Convergence Criteria
The cross-compatibility of certain fundamental design features across all linked 
schemes, what we may construe as core convergence criteria, is not optional but 
integral to the very functioning of any internationalised vision of emissions 
trading beyond the EU. The EU’s Seventh Environment Action Programme main-
tains that the EU ETS will ‘continue to be a central pillar of Union climate policy 
beyond 2020’. Indeed, the EU so far has built its climate policy on the assump-
tion that major trading partners will, over time, implement comparable pol-
icies.60 However, the need for early dialogue regarding core convergence 
criteria, particularly as trading schemes emerge beyond the EU, is fundamental 
and explains why the incremental alignment of key design features of emis-
sions trading schemes prior to the operationalisation of direct linkage may 
prove such a valuable route map to international emissions trading. The EU can 
proactively engage in this process by widely disseminating the lessons which 
have been learned from the EU ETS, lessons which are particularly important as 
the global regime continues to evolve.61
It is increasingly recognised that the EU ETS has emerged as an influen-
tial blueprint for other countries considering emissions trading as a climate 
59.  For example, in the context of passport and immigration controls and the Schengen 
area, EFTA Member States are already more fully integrated than some EU Member 
States. Ireland and Britain negotiated opt-outs from the Schengen accord and retain 
a distinct Common Travel Area separate from other EU Member States.
60.  Markus Wråke, Dallas Burtraw, Åsa Löfgren and Lars Zetterberg, ‘What Have We 
Learnt from the European Union’s Emissions Trading System?’ (2012) 41 Ambio: A 
Journal of the Human Environment 12, 20.
61.  Joseph Kruger, Wallace Oates and William Pizer, ‘Decentralization in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme and Lessons for Global Policy’ (2007) 1(1) Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy 112, 130.
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governance tool.62 South Korean policy-makers, for example, carefully studied 
the EU ETS in advance of launching their own emissions trading scheme in 2015 
which likely explains why, as Oh and colleagues have observed, ‘[s]imilarities 
between the EU ETS and the [South Korean emissions trading scheme] are eas-
ily found’.63 It remains crucial, however, that the EU continues to emphasise the 
importance of environmental integrity by making it clear that schemes which 
wish to link to the EU ETS are consistent with the core convergence criteria.
As Section 2.2.3 has explained, linkage by degrees accommodates multi-
speed incrementalist pathways towards direct linkage by fostering the gradual 
complementarity required between different trading schemes. It is possible 
that the commitment of partnering schemes to a shared over-arching decar-
bonisation objective will translate into a degree of organic complementarity 
and there is some tentative evidence of this. Sterk and Schüle have already 
noted that ‘some emerging regional schemes are broadly compatible with the 
EU ETS’.64 However misplaced confidence in such organic complementarity 
would be imprudent. If a global interconnected system of emissions trading 
schemes remains a priority, then it is crucial to establish frameworks and proce-
dures to promote the harmonisation of core convergence criteria.65 The foster-
ing and maintenance of this necessary degree of complementarity – achieved 
through implementation of the core convergence criteria – is not likely to result 
from the alignment of a common environmental commitment alone. Instead it 
will require continuing close coordination between regulatory authorities. This 
means that synchronisation of core convergence criteria is best conceived as a 
process, rather than an event, and the architecture facilitating such compatibil-
ity must acknowledge this reality.
3.2 The Threshold for Identifying Core Convergence Criteria
The threshold for classification of a design feature as a core convergence cri-
terion is inextricably linked to the fundamental over-arching carbon reduc-
tion objective of emissions trading. Consequently, the governing rule must 
require that any divergence between schemes’ design features which could 
compromise the environmental integrity objective is unacceptable. It is this 
62.  This has proven a double-edged sword. For example, continuing price instability 
in the EU ETS has also ‘unsettled’ other countries which had been inspired by the 
EU ETS: see Jørgen Wettestad and Torbjørg Jevnaker, ‘The EU’s Quest for Linked 
Carbon Markets: Turbulence and Headwind’ in Todd L Cherry, Jon Hovi and David M 
McEvoy (eds), Toward a New Climate Agreement: Confl ict, Resolution and Governance 
(Routledge 2014) 266, 274.
63.  Hyungna Oh, Junwon Hyon and Jin-Oh Kim, ‘Korea’s Approach to Overcoming 
Diffi  culties in Adopting the Emission Trading Scheme’ Climate Policy (forthcoming).
64.  Wolfgang Sterk and Ralf Schüle, ‘Advancing the Climate Regime through Linking 
Domestic Emission Trading Systems’ (2009) 14 Mitigation and Adaption Strategies 
for Global Change 409, 413.
65.  Türk, Mehling, Flachsland and Sterk (n 19) 355.
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fundamental rule of environmental integrity which governs the identification 
of core convergence criteria. In the context of linkage, environmental integrity 
requires defining core convergence criteria to ensure that directly linked trad-
ing schemes could not lead to fewer emissions reductions than if each scheme 
had continued to operate independently.
Additional principles to govern consideration of how and whether to link 
trading schemes, beyond environmental integrity, have also been recognised 
in the literature: Mace and Anderson, for example, have specifically identified 
three such principles, including institutional capacity, economic efficiency, and 
equity.66 However, these additional principles, whilst certainly of relevance in 
guiding trading schemes towards linkage, should not prove determinative in 
assessing whether linkage is appropriate. Instead, this article emphasises the 
supremacy of environmental integrity as a governing rule, not merely as one 
guiding principle amongst many. As such, institutional compatibility consid-
erations should be understood as ancillary to the governing rule and could, 
under certain conditions, prove necessary to ensure the maintenance of envi-
ronmental integrity.67 In such scenarios, environmental integrity remains the 
touchstone governing rule.
Direct linkage should theoretically unlock enhanced economic efficiencies, 
whilst likely facilitating the incremental construction of a climate governance 
framework which, in a manner resonant of Petsonk’s call to develop ‘docking 
stations’, could facilitate and incentivise access to emissions trading infrastruc-
tures.68 For example, in the context of linkage agreements, a docking station 
could include provisions which welcome the participation, in the new agree-
ment’s linked carbon market, of any state (or, indeed, regional entity) willing to 
comply with the core convergence criteria. However, the importance and influ-
ence of equity and fairness in constructing such climate governance arrange-
ments should not be understated and challenge policy-makers beyond the 
discrete context of emissions trading. There often exists an asymmetric power 
relationship between the importer and the exporter of environmental policies, 
usually in the form that the ‘weaker’ actor wishes to gain resources from the 
‘stronger’ one who can then impose access conditions, including the impor-
tation of a particular policy.69 This political reality reflects the fundamentally 
66.  Mace and Anderson (n 2) 217.
67.  For example, it is possible that the absence of a suffi  ciently robust institutional frame-
work could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, but this ultimately 
translates into a concern regarding the environmental rigour of the scheme, even if 
institutional capacity may be the source of such a potential environmental defi ciency.
68.  Annie Petsonk, ‘“Docking Stations”: Designing a More Welcoming Architecture 
for a Post-2012 Framework to Combat Climate Change’ (2009) 19 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 433.
69.  Kerstin Tews, ‘The Diff usion of Environmental Policy Innovations’ in Gerd Winter (ed), 
Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change: Perspectives from Science, 
Sociology and the Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 227, 229.
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unequal nature of international relations. Indeed, as Tucker observed, ‘[t]he his-
tory of the international system is a history of inequality par excellence’.70 Yet 
the nature of climate change, both with respect to the uneven historic respon-
sibility for emissions and the likely uneven distribution of the consequences of 
such catastrophic climate change, presents very real and challenging questions 
concerning equity and fairness. Such inequalities are discernible in regional 
relationships too. There are, for example, inequalities in the diffusion of environ-
mental regulatory practices within the EU and Kern, Jörgens and Jänicke have 
noted that ‘policy innovations initiated by smaller [EU] countries often deter-
mine behaviour only when larger and more influential countries like Germany 
or France adopt them as was the case with the diffusion of CO²/energy taxes’.71 
This is not to underplay the importance of principles of equity and fairness in 
climate law generally and emissions trading specifically, but rather to re-em-
phasise the exigency of progress towards the incremental construction of an 
effective climate governance architecture by identifying minimum thresholds 
for establishing linkages.72
Theoretically, the suggested governing rule of environmental integrity is 
sound. It posits that the linked trading schemes should not lead to fewer emis-
sions reductions than if the EU ETS and the proposed partner scheme had con-
tinued to operate independently. It is fortified by the premise that the primary 
purpose of deploying emissions trading as an environmental regulatory tool 
is an instrumentalist confidence in the contribution which it can make to the 
carbon reduction objective. The governing rule also encompasses institutional 
compatibility concerns where such circumstances may impact upon maintain-
ing the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Whilst the vision of an interna-
tional network of linked trading systems is actively promoted by the EU as a 
core objective of its climate governance strategy, it is critically important that 
this quest does not sacrifice the core environmental objective on the altar of 
political expediency. Therefore, in the absence of compliance with the core con-
vergence criteria, direct linkage should not occur.73 Such an approach is not 
without risk: by holding firm to the core convergence criteria, the EU ETS could 
70.  Robert Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (Basic Books 1977) 8, but Tucker’s perspec-
tives regarding the futility of eff orts to rebalance the international system are more 
contentious.
71.  Kristine Kern, Helge Jörgens and Martin Jänicke, ‘The Diff usion of Environmental 
Policy Innovations: A Contribution to the Globalisation of Environmental Policy’ 
(2001) Social Science Research Centre for Berlin (WZB) Discussion Paper FS II 01–30, 
23 (emphasis added).
72.  The importance of continued research to elaborate and frame the challenges of pro-
moting equity and fairness in climate governance is fundamental in the search for 
durable governance arrangements.
73.  Importantly, such compliance is a continuing process and necessarily must be sub-
ject to regular review.
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be locked out of early attempts to construct a globally linked scheme.74 Whilst 
this concern is real and must not be viewed complacently, there is an over- 
arching obligation on the EU to ensure that the very raison d’être for adopting 
emissions trading as the EU’s climate tool of preference is not compromised 
by efforts to more rapidly construct a climate governance framework. Such 
a trade-off would likely prove, particularly in the medium and longer term, a 
Faustian bargain with only illusory gains. In fact, this concern underscores the 
centrality of linkage by degrees in advancing incremental convergence.
The governing EU legislation, particularly the EU ETS Directive, necessarily 
provides the starting point to define core convergence criteria insofar as the 
provisions of the directive impose mandatory prerequisites for direct linkage 
which, in the absence of legislative amendment, cannot be overlooked. The 
directive explicitly advocates the prospect of linkage consistent with established 
EU political sentiment promoting the contribution of emissions trading to cli-
mate governance. For example, Article 25(1) provides that agreements ‘should 
be concluded with third countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol which 
have ratified the Protocol to provide for the mutual recognition of allowances 
between the Community scheme and other greenhouse gas emissions trading 
schemes’.75 However, this endorsement is not unconditional. Article 25(1a), as 
inserted by Directive 2009/29/EC, limits the scope of such linkage to ‘compat-
ible mandatory greenhouse gas emissions trading systems with absolute emis-
sions caps established in any country or in sub-federal or regional entities’.76 
As such, Article 25(1)(a) may be viewed as both expansive and constraining. 
Through the conditional language of Article 25(1)(a), the EU imposes threshold 
criteria for potential partner schemes: references to ‘compatible’, ‘mandatory’, 
and ‘absolute emissions caps’ suggests a legislative intention that linkage is not 
always desirable. These limitations are significant and will be unpacked further 
in Section 3.3. Yet, the EU ETS Directive also reassuringly provides that the range 
of potential linkage partners includes schemes with diverse geographic cover-
age and not merely national schemes. This raises the prospect of identifying 
appropriate linking partners beyond the state at both the sub-national and 
regional level and represents a significant expansion of the text from that of the 
original directive which restricted linkage to ‘third countries’. It may be surmised 
that an influential factor prompting this amendment had been the emergence 
of regional emissions trading schemes in the United States, particularly given 
continued Congressional inertia regarding a federal scheme.
3.3 The Core Convergence Criteria
This Section will establish the proposed core convergence criteria which must 
be present before a direct linkage is implemented. It is important to recall that 
74.  Gilbert (n 55) 916.
75.  EU ETS Directive, art 25(1) (emphasis added).
76.  EU ETS Directive, art 25(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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this is not a quest for perfectly identical emissions trading schemes, but rather 
a process of ensuring that the necessary de minimis degree of alignment has 
occurred before formal direct linkage is operationalised.77 Whilst linkage by 
degrees towards the implementation of direct linkage does not presume to 
provide a normatively superior alternative to a global agreement leading to the 
creation of an international cap-and-trade system, the listless nature of climate 
negotiations to date also amply demonstrates the need to achieve measurable 
progress, where possible, beyond the multilateral context.
The EU ETS Directive, by imposing the restriction that linkage is permissible 
only with ‘compatible’ trading schemes, necessarily provides the starting point 
for any enquiry to define core convergence criteria.78 Significantly, such a start-
ing point does not preclude the possibility of normatively reimagining the con-
tours imposed by the legislation, but instead acknowledges the relevance and 
influence of the present legislative language in seeking to ascertain and define 
core convergence criteria. Consequently, Article 25(1)(a) identifies specific crite-
ria indicative of ‘compatibility’: for example, a candidate emissions scheme must 
contain ‘absolute emissions caps’ and must be ‘mandatory’. As such, these design 
features are defined below as the first and second core convergence criteria. 
Whilst the language of Article 25(1)(a) is silent as to whether these design fea-
tures constitute the only criteria of compatibility, a teleological interpretation of 
the text, as has been favoured by the European Court of Justice, tends to suggest 
that any meaningful definition of compatibility must extend beyond requiring 
that a candidate scheme is mandatory with an absolute emissions cap.79
3.3.1 Absolute Emissions Cap
The text of Article 25(1)(a) provides the first core convergence criterion: any 
potential partner scheme must impose an absolute emissions cap. As this 
Section will elaborate, there are a number of additional core convergence cri-
teria which, if absent, could undermine the integrity of the EU ETS. That said, 
legislative emphasis on the importance of an absolute emissions cap is not 
misplaced.
In this context, it is relevant to recall that the implementation in the EU 
ETS of a single Union-wide absolute cap was slow, litigious, and far from 
77.  Burtraw and colleagues (n 19) 10.
78.  EU ETS Directive, art 25(1)(a).
79.  For example, in the seminal case, Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ emphasised that it is nec-
essary to consider ‘the spirit, the general scheme and the wording’. In the CILFIT case 
the ECJ affi  rmed that ‘every provision of Community law must be placed in its con-
text and interpreted in the light of the provisions of EC law as a whole, regard being 
had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the 
provision in question is to be applied’. See Case C–283/ 81 Srl CILFIT and Lanifi cio di 
Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 252, para 20. See also Nial Fennelly, ‘Legal 
Interpretation at the European Court of Justice’ (1996) 20(3) Fordham International 
Law Journal 656.
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straightforward. In fact, recognition of the fundamental importance of an abso-
lute cap came late in the day and it was only after the first two phases of the 
EU ETS, during which concerning discrepancies regarding Member States’ NAPs 
surfaced, that the necessity of such a single EU-wide cap gained widespread 
acceptance. The Amending Directive replaced national Member State caps 
with an EU-wide cap and for the first time in 2013 the cap across the EU (and 
Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland) represented a single Union-wide cap set at 
2,084,301,856 allowances, rather than the aggregate of Member States’ individ-
ual caps.80 Under Article 9 of the Directive, for every year during Phase III this 
cap will decrease by a linear factor of 1.74 per cent of the average total quan-
tity of allowances issued annually during Phase II from 2008–2012.81 Due to the 
operation of this mechanism, by 2020 emissions from fixed installations will be 
21 per cent lower than in 2005.82 The operation of this decreasing cap mecha-
nism is fundamental to the fabric of the EU ETS and the absolute emissions cap 
requirement in Article 25(1) is best understood as a commitment to preserve 
this functionality. Given the tortuous history which led to the creation of such 
a single EU-wide cap, ensuring that this cap is not compromised is critical to 
the functioning of the EU ETS. The amended EU ETS Directive permits only very 
limited intervention in the market in ‘the event of excessive price fluctuations’.83
The implementation of direct linkage between the EU ETS and a scheme 
which permitted cost-containment interventions in the market such as ‘price 
ceilings’, often also termed ‘safety valves’, would seriously undermine the oper-
ability of the EU ETS in a number of ways. Such mechanisms provide for the 
release of additional allowances to the market by the scheme regulator once a 
certain upper price threshold is breached without regard to an absolute cap. In 
practice, this would effectively result in the importation of the linked scheme’s 
price ceiling into the EU ETS. As we can expect linkage to generally result in a 
blending of design features, such a price ceiling would inevitably increase emis-
sions in the EU ETS, as extra allowances freely trade between schemes, gradu-
ally rendering the absolute emissions cap obsolete.
The extent of potential distortions on the EU ETS is difficult to predict and 
will depend to a large extent on market factors in the linked scheme and how 
a price ceiling is implemented. For example, the potential increase in the sup-
ply of allowances exported to the EU ETS is limited to the supply of permits in 
the linked scheme: this suggests that the greater the number of allowances in 
circulation in the linked scheme, then the more material the potential distor-
tive effects of a price ceiling on the EU ETS. However, any release of additional 
80.  Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community [2009] OJ L140/63.
81.  In absolute terms this equates to an annual reduction in allowances by 38,264,246.
82.  Article 9 mandates that the Commission review the linear factor from 2020 with a 
view to the adoption of a decision by 2025.
83.  EU ETS Directive, art 29a.
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allowances in a linked scheme will also affect the revenue accruing to the gov-
ernment there, presuming that the additional allowances are auctioned (rather 
than grandfathered) at the trigger price. It is likely that the revenue implications 
alone – quite distinct from the potential adverse impacts on the environmental 
integrity objective – would also raise considerable concerns. In the absence of 
an absolute emissions cap, it is reasonable to expect that such revenue-related 
political concerns could, irrespective of Article 25(1), present a serious obstacle 
to linkage.84
Unsurprisingly, the prohibition contained in Article 25(1) enjoys broad sup-
port in the literature. Gilbert has emphasised that the environmental stringency 
of individual schemes is ‘absolutely key in determining the success or failure of 
a linking initiative’,85 whilst Fischer’s research has demonstrated that ‘[w]ithout 
some policy of adjustment or a switch to a fixed cap, allowing trade between a 
rate-based emissions program and a cap-and-trade program will tend to lead 
to an expansion of overall emissions’.86 Sterk and Schüle have noted that ‘[o]ne 
of the main advantages of cap-and-trade emission trading is the ability to pre-
cisely define the environmental outcome … [but] price caps and safety valves 
crack the cap’.87 Meanwhile, Goers and Pflüglmayer have described the poten-
tial consequences of establishing a linkage of the EU ETS with a scheme with-
out an absolute emissions cap as ‘disabling ecological effectiveness’ and, for this 
reason alone, have suggested exclusion of Alberta’s emissions trading scheme 
from further consideration as a potential linkage partner.88
84.  A separate question, beyond the focus of this article, concerns the appropriate-
ness of regulatory intervention in an emissions trading scheme. For example, 
Commission Regulation No 176/2014 has postponed the auctioning of 900 million 
allowances due to depressed demand from the years 2013–15 until 2019–20. Such 
‘back- loading’ of auctions does not detrimentally aff ect the maintenance of the 
absolute cap and therefore does not breach the governing rule of environmental 
integrity. In the context of direct linkage, it is suggested that such intervention could 
only occur subject to consultations with and (potentially) the consent of partner 
regulatory authorities.
85.  Gilbert (n 55) 914.
86.  Carolyn Fischer, ‘Combining Rate-Based and Cap-and-Trade Emissions Policies?’ 
(2003) 3(S2) Climate Policy S89, S101.
87.  Sterk and Schüle (n 64) 419.
  As a practical matter, Sterk and Kruger have elaborated: ‘through linking a sys-
tem without price controls to a system with price control mechanisms, the former 
would eff ectively cede control over its allowance price and emissions to the latter. 
It does not seem likely that the former would be willing to pursue such a policy.’ 
See Wolfgang Sterk and Joseph Kruger, ‘Establishing a Transatlantic Carbon Market’ 
(2009) 9 Climate Policy 389, 397.
88.  Sebastian Goers and Barbara Pfl üglmayer, ‘Post-Kyoto Global Emissions Trading: 
Perspectives for Linking National Emissions Trading Schemes with the EU ETS in a 
Bottom-Up Approach’ (2012) 3 Low Carbon Economy 69, 74.
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The Alberta emissions trading scheme, which has been in operation since 
2007, aims to achieve an annual reduction of energy intensity by 12 per cent; 
but it does not impose an absolute cap. In fact, under the Alberta scheme it is 
possible that emissions could increase, as long as any such increase is justified 
by an increase in production or GDP and the emissions have stayed below the 
relative target. Perversely, entities under the scheme with relative targets may 
even have good reason to increase their emissions since they will receive addi-
tional allowances the more they produce, whereas entities in a scheme with a 
fixed cap must confront higher costs for any increase of emissions. Any such 
phenomenon in a linked context would inflate the amount of allowances avail-
able in the EU ETS which, in turn, would confound progress towards achieve-
ment of the core environmental integrity objective. It is no surprise then that 
scholars have warned against the EU negotiating ‘lowest common denomina-
tor agreements’ in environmental terms’.89
More fundamentally the choice of a design architecture characterised by 
relative targets (or otherwise modest environmental targets) reflects a politi-
cal choice to subordinate the environmental objective to the minimisation of 
participants’ compliance costs. Such divergence, perhaps most evident in tech-
nical design features such as the presence or absence of an absolute cap, clearly 
raise more general concerns regarding the comparable ambitiousness – and 
resulting compatibility – of the climate policy outlook of individual schemes. 
Without sufficiently ambitious environmental targets set by public regulation 
there remains a risk that ‘an efficient servant will become an unjust and unsus-
tainable master’.90 In any event, the prohibitive language of Article 25(1) means 
that there is no scope for linkage where a partner scheme does not provide for 
an absolute emissions cap. However, it is also clear that any analysis of compati-
bility must reach beyond the presence or absence of an absolute emissions cap 
in a partner scheme.
3.3.2 Mandatory Targets
In addition to the absolute cap requirement, Article 25(1) further requires that 
any candidate linking scheme must be ‘mandatory’. The distinction between 
what have been categorised as ‘compliance markets’ and ‘voluntary markets’ 
is critical.91 Whilst both forms of markets may impose absolute caps, compli-
ance markets are mandatory, in the sense of Article 25(1), by public regulatory 
underpinning. Voluntary markets are based on private law and do not rely on 
public regulation to generate demand. The fact that these markets continue 
89.  Gilbert (n 55) 916.
90.  Herman Daly, ‘Free Market Environmentalism: Turning a Good Servant into a Bad 
Master’ (1993) 6(2) Critical Review 171, 173.
91.  Eva Lövbrand and Johannes Stripple, ‘Disrupting the Public-Private Distinction: 
Excavating the Government of Carbon Markets Post-Copenhagen’ (2012) 30(4) 
Environment and Planning C Government and Policy 658, 662.
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to exhibit organic growth without any government mandate has been one of 
the more interesting, and indeed surprising, features of the emerging emissions 
trading landscape.92 
The rationale for and emergence of voluntary markets provides salient 
insights into the complex influences driving the decarbonisation agenda. The 
emergence of such markets, when considered under an orthodox economics 
or corporate behaviour lens, seems counter-intuitive, almost illogical. Yet as 
consumer awareness surrounding climate change has developed, demand for 
action by consumer product and services companies to reduce carbon emis-
sions or to offset them has grown dramatically.93 The fact that climate science 
has gradually moved from a discipline openly contested to one which has now 
secured a settled consensus has also contributed to moving carbon reduction 
measures onto the centre ground of political and policy debates.94 Economic 
analyses demonstrating that the costs of reducing carbon emissions are far lower 
than the unpredictable and potentially vast costs of catastrophic climate change 
have also contributed to the emergence of a new orthodoxy within a corporate 
context which is responsive to the realities of climate science. Shareholders and 
investors are also putting increasing pressure on corporate management to 
focus on carbon reduction.95 This is less influenced by altruistic environmental 
concerns and is more likely the product of a growing recognition that ignoring 
the potential risks would be fiscally irresponsible.96 This confluence of diverse 
factors has influenced the emergence of a new ‘climate capitalism’ which, whilst 
especially evident within mandatory compliance markets, also extends well 
beyond those confines to the evolution of voluntary markets.97
92.  Scott Deatherage, Carbon Trading Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2011) 64.
93.  ibid 65.
94.  Naomi Oreskes, ‘The Scientifi c Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know 
We’re Not Wrong?’ in Joseph DiMento and Pamela Doughman (eds), Climate Change: 
What It Means for Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren (MIT Press 2007) 65.
  Of course, this consensus has travelled further in some contexts than others: Brad 
Cooper, ‘Climate Science, Like Evolution Before, a Kansas Legislative Controversy’ 
(The Wichita Eagle, 1 March 2013) <http://www.kansas.com/2013/03/01/2697018/
climate-science-like-evolution.html> accessed 2 May 2017.
95.  Consider, for example, the Exxon Mobil shareholder revolt in 2008 during which 
19 institutional investors with 91 million shares worth $8.6 billion tabled a motion 
(albeit unsuccessfully) requesting Exxon’s board to address climate change risks and 
opportunities.
96.  Felicia Jackson, Conquering Carbon: Carbon Emissions, Carbon Markets, and the 
Consumer (New Holland Publishers Ltd 2009) 59.
97.  The term is Newell and Peterson’s and does not endorse a ‘blind faith in capitalism to 
adequately address climate change’. Instead, the authors emphasise the corporate 
behavioural changes (including the development of voluntary markets) which sug-
gests that the foundations of a decarbonised economy are emerging. See Peter Newell 
and Matthew Peterson, Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of 
the Global Economy Consumer (Cambridge University Press 2010) 1–11.
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The contribution of voluntary markets in shaping the climate governance 
landscape may be substantial beyond operating as a testing ground for indus-
try before mandatory trading. Peters-Stanley and Yin have observed that ‘[w]
hat the voluntary markets lack in size, they make up for in flexibility –  spinning 
off innovations in project finance, monitoring, and methodologies that also 
influence regulatory market mechanisms’.98 The voluntary markets have been 
credited with spawning their own standards, registries, and project types 
beyond the scope of existing compliance market mechanisms. As a result, it 
has been noted that governments have increasingly turned to voluntary car-
bon market mechanisms – particularly standards and registries – to inform the 
development of or serve as compliance instruments themselves.99 Such diverse 
and experiential nodes of governance further demonstrate the complexity of 
the climate governance mosaic. Yet, the maintenance of complementarity in 
a world awash with different approaches raises significant governance chal-
lenges. Whilst climate governance experiments continue to shape how states 
respond to climate change, the voluntary carbon markets, in particular, have 
attracted significant criticism based on perceived lax quality control. This con-
cern is intimately connected with questions of monitoring, reporting, and 
verification which shall be separately evaluated later in this Article, but the 
perception of voluntary markets as an unrestricted version of compliance mar-
kets has given rise to characterisations of such exchanges as ‘buyer-beware’ 
markets.100
From the perspective of Article 25(1), voluntary emissions trading schemes 
present serious challenges to the EU ETS. To be a suitable partner for link-
age, the candidate trading scheme should demonstrate a clear commitment 
to emissions trading in the medium to long term. From the perspective of a 
well-functioning market capable of delivering some degree of certainty to its 
participants, linking would be risky if a scheme had no clarity on a succession 
plan. Whilst this would also be the case in compliance markets with an early 
expiration date and no clear commitment in succeeding years beyond such a 
date, the innately provisional nature of voluntary markets adds further doubt 
  This perspective is highly contentious. Böhm, Misoczky and Moog have argued 
that carbon markets ‘are unlikely to transform capitalist dynamics in ways that 
might foster a more sustainable global economy’: see Steff en Böhm, Maria Ceci 
Misoczky and Sandra Mogg, ‘Greening Capitalism? A Marxist Critique of Carbon 
Markets’ (2012) 33(11) Organisation Studies 1617.
 98.  Molly Peters-Stanley and Daphne Yin, Maneuvering the Mosaic: State of the Voluntary 
Carbon Markets 2013 (Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace and Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance 2013) 5.
 99.  ibid.
100.  Deepanshi Chaudhry, ‘A Brief Study of Voluntary Carbon Markets, Recent and Future 
Trends with Special Focus on India’ (July 2008) <http://www.researchgate.net/
publication/228311270_A_Brief_Study_of_Voluntary_Carbon_Markets_Recent_ 
and_Future_Trends_with_Special_Focus_on_India> accessed 2 May 2017.
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about the continuity of any such linkage. This would create serious concerns 
amongst EU ETS participants about the permanence of the link and could ulti-
mately diminish the liquidity of allowances generated in the linked scheme. 
Clearly in these circumstances Article 25(1) is correct to consider the ‘manda-
tory’ element of a candidate scheme as a core convergence criterion.
3.3.3 Unconstrained Borrowing
Emissions trading schemes which permit borrowing allowances from future 
trading phases may pose particular risks for the environmental integrity of the 
EU ETS. Borrowing during the life of a particular compliance phase is implic-
itly permitted in the EU ETS by virtue of the lag-time between satisfaction of 
the previous year’s compliance obligations and the allocation of the next year’s 
allowances. For example, allowances are allocated by 28 February of each year, 
whilst allowances must be surrendered equal to the total (verified) emissions to 
satisfy with the previous calendar year’s trading period by 30 April each year. It 
is therefore not a case of borrowing per se constituting a core convergence cri-
terion, as the structure of the EU ETS provides scope for borrowing, albeit within 
a relatively narrow window. Article 25(1) is silent with respect to any reference 
to borrowing and the structure of such a facility in a candidate partner scheme. 
However, borrowing between trading phases within the EU ETS is not permit-
ted. As such, allowances generated during Phase II which ended in 2012 could 
not be surrendered for compliance with obligations which now arise during the 
life of Phase III. 
However, unconstrained borrowing could seriously undermine achievement 
of the carbon reduction goals of the EU ETS to such an extent as to be incom-
patible with advancing the EU’s environmental target.101 The ability of market 
actors in one scheme to borrow against periods with an unfixed length, or peri-
ods for which allocations have not yet been specified, would undermine the 
present penalties for non-compliance and undercut the environmental integ-
rity of the EU ETS.102 In fact, the function of an unconstrained borrowing facility 
within an emissions trading scheme is more akin in practice to the operation of 
a price ceiling. However, not only is borrowing from future commitment periods 
likely to delay carbon abatement but, perhaps paradoxically, high rates of bor-
rowing may even result in escalating future abatement costs. Such a scenario 
could ultimately result in increased pressure on government to relax emission 
caps, thereby also imperilling the medium to long term integrity of the environ-
mental objective.103
101.  Emilie Alberola and Julien Chevallier, ‘European Carbon Prices and Banking 
Restrictions: Evidence From Phase I (2005–2007)’ (2009) 30(3) Energy Journal 51.
102.  Mace and Anderson (n 2) 219.
103.  Catherine Boemare and Philippe Quirion, ‘Implementing Greenhouse Gas Trading 
in Europe: Lessons from Economic Literature and International Experiences’ (2002) 
42(2) Ecological Economics 213.
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Borrowing may also give actors with high abatement costs an incentive to 
delay costly investments in clean technologies by borrowing allowances from 
future periods, and to concentrate emissions in early periods. Consequently, 
unrestricted borrowing may aggravate environmental harm by facilitating the 
concentration of the emissions stream in the earlier years of a trading phase.104 
In order to maintain the environmental effectiveness of linked schemes, any 
provisions permitting borrowing require restrictive provisions limiting its influ-
ence, the precise crafting of which necessarily involves close collaboration 
between the Commission and any candidate linking partner scheme’s authority. 
3.3.4 Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification of Emissions (MRV)
The EU has emphasised that the ‘complete, consistent, transparent and accurate 
monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions are fundamental for the 
effective operation’ of the EU ETS.105 This reflects Articles 14 and 15 of the EU 
ETS Directive, which address the MRV of emissions data. The need for greater EU 
uniformity with respect to MRV became clear during Phases I and II. The origi-
nal language of the EU ETS Directive had given ‘considerable flexibility to both 
installations and to Member States’.106 The high level of decentralisation and 
the significant degree of discretion for Member States was widely recognised 
by scholars during the pilot phase and it was widely acknowledged that this 
might well pose a challenge in achieving the degree of consistency required to 
provide trust in the scheme’s MRV rules.107 Kruger and Pizer identified the crux 
of the problem: ‘[l]eft unresolved is the question of who will resolve inconsis-
tencies if different Member State governments or the third party verifiers they 
hire vary in their interpretations of EU monitoring or verification guidelines’.108
In the context of the EU, perhaps this should not be surprising. Significantly 
different legal systems, enforcement cultures, and administrative capabilities 
across the EU have created a variable geometry concerning implementation. 
This was particularly evident during the pilot phase of the EU ETS with Slovakia 
failing to draft a satisfactory NAP, whilst the NAPs of Poland and the Czech 
Republic failed to meet the Commission’s deadline. However, such concerns 
regarding administrative capacity, whilst identified by some scholars as partic-
ularly important due to the EU’s expansion, are not restricted to the then-recent 
104.  Julien Chevallier, ‘Banking and Borrowing in the EU ETS: A Review of Economic 
Modelling, Current Provisions And Prospects for Future Design’ (2012) 26(1) Journal 
of Economic Surveys 157, 172.
105.  Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 of 21 June 2012, on the monitoring and 
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council [2012] OJ L181/30.
106.  Kruger, Oates and Pizer (n 61) 124.
107.  Joseph Kruger and Christian Egenhofer, ‘Sustainable Development Law and Policy’ 
(2006) 6(2) Sustainable Development Law and Policy 2, 6.
108.  Joseph Kruger and William Pizer, ‘Greenhouse Gas Trading in Europe: The New 
Grand Policy Experiment’ (2004) 36(8) Environment 8, 15.
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accession states alone.109 Doubts have also been expressed, for example, 
regarding the ability of the Spanish authorities to translate policy support for 
stringent monitoring into effective climate action.110
Achieving consistency, however, is a permanent challenge for the EU and it is 
not surprising that this has equally proven the case in the context of emissions 
trading generally and MRV particularly. However, incremental harmonisation 
has become the EU’s tried and tested route map. Regulation 601/2012 concern-
ing monitoring and reporting promotes such harmonisation, but the prospect 
of formal direct linkage would significantly sharpen concerns related to MRV. For 
example, the differences in cultures of enforcement and administrative capacity 
within the EU is only a fraction of what exists if one were to compare the EU 
as a whole to Russia or China.111 Whilst many commentators have encouraged 
developing countries with potentially weaker legal and economic institutions to 
embrace market mechanisms,112 an uneven approach to MRV could create unfair 
competitive advantages for firms in states with less robust enforcement regimes 
and discolour the metric by which progress towards the carbon reduction objec-
tives is measured. The capacity to conceal or obstruct progress, thereby endan-
gering the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, is of sufficiently serious concern 
to warrant the inclusion of MRV as an important core convergence criterion.
Unlike other core convergence criteria, an assessment of MRV compatibility 
requires a value determination along a continuum of compliance. This should 
not be considered a negative quality: since linkage is likely to happen in an 
incrementalist manner, this creates the necessary space for dialogue and dis-
cussion regarding MRV and how best to ensure that one scheme’s approach 
to MRV has the confidence of its potential linkage partner. Moreover, the EU’s 
successful implementation of direct linkage between the EU ETS and Norway 
has demonstrated that MRV provisions need not be identical. For example, the 
Norwegian emissions trading scheme requires participating entities to monitor 
and report their emissions on an annual basis but, unlike the EU ETS, does not 
require independent verification of an entity’s emissions data.113 Instead, it is 
109.  Kruger, Oates and Pizer (n 61) 118.
110.  J David Tàbara, ‘Spain: Words that Succeed and Climate Policies that Fail’ (2003) 3(1) 
Climate Policy 19.
111.  Kruger, Oates and Pizer (n 61) 128.
112.  Ruth Bell and Cliff ord Russell, ‘Environmental Policy for Developing Countries’ 
(2002) 18(3) Issues in Science and Technology 63 and Allen Blackman and Winston 
Harrington, ‘The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons 
from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution’ (2000) 9(1) Journal of 
Environment and Development 5.
113.  Chapter 4 (s 16), Act of 17 December 2004 No 99 Relating to Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowance Trading and the Duty to Surrender Emission Allowances. See 
Norwegian Government, ‘Acts and Regulations’ <https://www.regjeringen.no/
en/dokumenter/ greenhouse-gas-emission-trading-act/id172242/> accessed 2 
May 2017.
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open to the Norwegian regulator, on a case-by-case basis, to ‘decide that the 
emissions report from an operator shall be verified by an independent third 
party before it is submitted’.114 The absence of a mandatory requirement for 
independent verification has not been considered material by EU policy- makers 
and has not obstructed the implementation of direct linkage. Consequently, 
approximate equivalence, from an MRV perspective, seems the most sensible 
way to satisfy this convergence criterion.
As the process of identifying and elaborating core convergence criteria 
demonstrates, progress on MRV compatibility is one theme in the search for a 
suitable framework to integrate fragmented trading efforts into a more coher-
ent global approach. Ideally peer review of the EU’s experience with MRV will 
promote learning and foster the gradual dissemination of best practice, partic-
ularly as progress towards linking emissions trading schemes is likely to remain 
fragmented and multi-speed. Policy-makers in emerging emissions trading 
schemes are often keen to learn from the EU and policy diffusion through 
learning offers real opportunities for the EU to emphasise the importance of 
early discussions regarding MRV compatibility.115 The maintenance of a zone of 
compatibility, which necessarily entails the promotion of complementarity and 
avoidance of the development of conflictive core design features, must be a key 
focus for EU policy-makers and decision-makers in the years ahead. 
3.3.5 Equivalent Rules Governing Fungibility of Carbon Credits
The EU currently permits, with restrictions, regulated entities to surrender 
carbon credits purchased from CDM projects, Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs), to meet their domestic EU ETS commitments.116 Whilst the CDM is not 
the only offset programme in existence, it is certainly the most significant. As of 
31 December 2016, over 7,750 projects have been approved since operationali-
sation of the CDM and more than 1.75 billion offset credits have been issued.117 
During Phase II of the EU ETS, Member States retained discretion to decide the 
rules relating to the usage of CERs. Consequently, each Member State individ-
ually determined the percentage of offsets allowed (as a percentage of total 
allowances). The range of flexibility varied markedly between Member States 
from 0 per cent in Estonia to 20 per cent in neighbouring Lithuania (and 
Germany and Spain).118 Moreover, seven Member States (Germany, Spain, Italy, 
114.  ibid Chapter 4 (s 17).
115.  Betsill and Hoff mann (n 52) 100.
116.  Commission Regulation (EU) No 1123/2013 of 8 November 2013 on determining 
international credit entitlements pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council [2013] OJ L299/32.
117.  Clean Development Mechanism, ‘CDM Insights: Project Activities’ (31 December 
2016) <http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/CDMinsights/index.html> accessed 
2 May 2017.
118.  Raphael Trotignon, ‘Combining Cap-and-Trade with Off sets: Lessons from the EU–
ETS’ (2009) 12(3) Climate Policy 273, 276.
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France, Poland, the UK and the Czech Republic) accounted for over 75 per cent 
of total use across the EU.119 The Commission has since moved to harmonise the 
use of offsets within the EU.120 As a result, the exact amount eligible for use per 
operator until 2020 depends on whether or not the operator is a new entrant, 
but existing operators may only use CERs either up to the amount allowed in 
the period from 2008 to 2012 or to an amount corresponding to a maximum of 
11 per cent of its allocation in the period from 2008 to 2012, whichever is the 
higher.121
As the experience of the EU ETS has demonstrated, offset credits have 
matured to become a stable feature of the carbon trading landscape. However, 
there remains the potential for significant divergence between the rules gov-
erning their use across different emissions trading schemes. This is clearly a 
material consideration in circumstances where allowances and credits are fun-
gible since unrestricted trading between linked schemes would permit credits 
generated in one scheme to enter the other scheme, even if this was not con-
sistent with the latter scheme’s recognition rules. Whilst it would remain open 
to the EU ETS (or any partner emissions trading scheme) to limit the quantity 
and quality of allowances from the CDM or, alternatively, to apply an exchange 
rate, this would not entirely resolve the supply-and-demand dynamics result-
ing from the free circulation of credits in the linked partner scheme.
Substantial divergence between rules governing fungibility of carbon cred-
its could materially impact pricing in linked schemes and ultimately disrupt 
the operation of a scheme’s absolute cap.122 As such, rules governing recog-
nition of offsets which may be surrendered for compliance purposes are inex-
tricably connected to preserving the environmental integrity of an emissions 
trading scheme. Consequently, it is appropriate to categorise the implementa-
tion and maintenance of equivalent mechanisms of fungibility of offset cred-
its as a core convergence criterion. The importance of this classification as a 
core convergence criterion becomes evident by surveying the current diver-
sity of approaches to mechanisms governing fungibility of offset credits. Draft 
119.  ibid.
120.  Commission Regulation (EU) No 1123/2013 (n 116).
121.  ibid, art 1(1).
122.  Moreover, as Sterk and Kruger have noted, there may be serious political reper-
cussions from such commingling of credits and allowances in the absence of 
cross-compatibility: see Sterk and Kruger (n 87) 395.
  It is recognised that given the potential for disruption to a scheme’s overall emis-
sions cap, it is conceptually legitimate to categorise compatibility of rules govern-
ing the recognition of off sets as a subset of the fi rst core convergence criterion 
which requires the presence of an absolute emissions cap in any candidate partner 
scheme. However, it is suggested that the dynamic and materially relevant nature 
of off set schemes, which also constitute indirect linkages in their own right (as 
identifi ed in Section 2.2.2), merits particular recognition as a distinct core conver-
gence criterion.
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 legislation for federal trading schemes in the United States, for example, such 
as the Waxman-Markey proposals and the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner propos-
als, had envisaged permitting the use of offset credits generated from carbon 
sinks and domestic offset initiatives, both of which are not recognised for com-
pliance purposes in the EU ETS. Separately, South Korea’s emissions trading 
scheme only recognises offset credits generated from domestic projects and 
the South Korean government has not yet clarified if it will permit linkage with 
the CDM or any successor mechanism developed under the auspices of the 
Paris Agreement.123
It is therefore unsurprising that the importance of equivalent rules on the 
fungibility of carbon credits has been recognised by the Commission which has 
explicitly acknowledged that the EU should seek ‘common ground’ with other 
countries to ‘ensure a coherent transition’.124 This is particularly so given that, 
regardless of the status of multilateral climate negotiations, linkage by degrees 
between regional and national emissions trading schemes is likely to deepen 
with offset schemes continuing to constitute a key component of the emerging 
climate governance mosaic.
4  Devising Architectures to Implement Linkage
The identification of core convergence criteria is fundamental to determining 
the degree of compatibility necessary to harmoniously advance the underly-
ing environmental rationale of emissions trading. Such a process of identifi-
cation does not, however, predestine a particular pathway towards full direct 
linkage. Given that the design of an institutional architecture promoting (and 
supporting) linkage is not preset, policy-makers must instead engage in dia-
logue assessing potential future frameworks for linkage. Climate governance 
has become the province of multiple actors with governance experimentation 
occurring in multiple areas and at multiple scales. In this sense, climate gover-
nance can properly be characterised as multi-actor and multi-scalar.125 Given 
this empirical reality of governance processes simultaneously occurring in mul-
tiple places and distributed across differing levels of social organisation, the 
123.  Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Permits 2012 (Act No 11419, 
14 May 2012), art 29(3) and Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Allocation and 
Trading of Greenhouse Gas Permits (Presidential Decree No 24180, 15 November 
2012), art 38: see Korea Legislation Research Institute (KRLI) Legislative Translation 
Centre, ‘Statutes of the Republic of Korea’ <http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.
do> accessed 2 May 2017. (Translations provided by the KRLI are not offi  cial ver-
sions and thus are not equally authentic to the original version in Korean.)
124.  Commission, ‘Towards a Comprehensive Climate Change Agreement in 
Copenhagen’ (n 6).
125.  Harriet Bulkeley and Susanne Moser, ‘Responding to Climate Change: Governance 
and Social Action beyond Kyoto’ (2007) 7(2) Global Environmental Politics 1, 8.
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focus – as Young might suggest – shifts to ‘taking steps to ensure that cross-
scale interactions produce complementary rather than conflicting actions’.126
The process of identifying core convergence criteria is consistent with the 
search to allocate specific tasks to the appropriate level since such an endeav-
our necessarily entails the discovery and recognition of key design features of 
emissions trading, the compatibility of which must take place at a level beyond 
that of individual emissions trading schemes. The principle of promoting com-
plementarity requires consideration of how to implement an appropriate 
architecture to either guard against conflictive actions or, more ambitiously, to 
actively nurture and facilitate complementarity and ultimately linkage. To put it 
more bluntly, it is possible here to distinguish a simple-complementarity school 
from a strong-complementarity school.127 For the former, complementarity is 
essentially defined by the absence of conflict between multiple governance 
approaches irrespective of parallel progress towards coordination and enhance-
ment of climate governance, much less ‘linkage by degrees’. However, the latter 
is more demanding: it considers that real complementarity must entail progress 
towards the development and implementation of linkages and that the flailing 
multilateral vision must not be abandoned, but rather re- imagined as an incre-
mental process of scaling-up.
Whilst such a debate is already underway concerning viable frameworks 
for configuring climate governance more generally, it is important to recon-
struct this discussion in the more discrete context of emissions trading to allow 
a closer evaluation of the linkage implications of this debate. The process of 
expanding (or what may, perhaps, critically be conceived as exporting) emis-
sions trading requires achieving a fine balance between maximising avenues 
for broader participation in climate governance, whilst ensuring that such 
expanded participation does not undermine the environmental integrity of 
governance initiatives. Victor, House, and Joy, whilst acknowledging that such 
bottom-up harmonisation of emissions trading may be ‘painfully slow and 
sprawling’,128 have suggested that such an approach is ‘the only way to build 
126.  Young, ‘Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale 
Interactions’ (n 20) 266.
127.  In this context, this article builds on the analogous bifurcation which Grossman 
and Leblond have made in the context of European fi nancial integration. Whilst 
recognising that the recent history of fi nancial integration in the EU can generally 
be considered a success story, a distinction is drawn between a simple-integration 
school and a strong-integration school. For the former, integration is essentially 
defi ned by increasing cross-border fi nancial fl ows of any kind, whereas the latter 
is more demanding: it considers that real integration must entail convergence not 
only of prices and rates, but also of business models, governance, refi nancing prac-
tices and so on: see Emiliano Grossman and Patrick Leblond, ‘European Financial 
Integration: Finally the Great Leap Forward’ (2011) 49(2) Journal of Common Market 
Studies 413, 419.
128.  Victor, House and Joy (n 22) 1821.
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credible institutions that are essential for markets’.129 Undoubtedly there are 
also drawbacks to this approach. It involves a departure from the established 
principle in international environmental negotiations that ‘nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed’, a principle which has facilitated grand bargains to 
be struck based on a complex web of concessions across a range of issues and 
countries.130 However, the pursuit of a universalist illusion may prove myopic 
and risk condemning climate governance to glacial progress which – given 
the urgency of the underlying environmental challenge – is clearly unaccept-
able. Instead, devising institutions which promote incremental harmonisation 
by holding out the prospect of the bottom-up formation of a framework with 
gradual global coverage offers a viable route towards advancing strong com-
plementarity. This is particularly the case in the context of emissions trading 
and linkage by degrees could present an incrementalist pathway towards fuller 
integration in the form of direct linkage.
5 Conclusion
This article has argued that the implementation of durable linkage arrange-
ments between emissions trading schemes is possible and desirable, but 
potential partner schemes must demonstrate compatibility with certain core 
convergence criteria. It is likely that the importance of linkage will develop 
further given the continuing absence of any binding post-Kyoto commitment 
targets. Significantly, the Paris Agreement does not depart from the existing 
consensus favouring a role for market-based initiatives in climate governance, 
but rather the language of the Agreement confirms the continuation of such 
a consensus.131 Article 6.4, for example, envisages a successor mechanism 
to the CDM, but it remains to be seen whether this will represent an entirely 
new mechanism or a ‘revamped CDM’.132 Beyond this innovation, however, the 
prominent inclusion of market approaches throughout Article 6 ‘giv[es] them a 
renewed role in international efforts to combat climate change’.133
Despite this renewed role, the emergence of diverging critical design fea-
tures in candidate partner schemes would seriously impede the contribution 
of emissions trading to climate governance. At the time of writing, the Chinese 
129.  ibid 1821.
130.  Robert Falkner, Hannes Stephan and John Vogler, ‘International Climate Policy after 
Copenhagen: Towards a “Building Blocks” Approach’ (2010) 1(3) Global Policy 252, 
260.
131.  The contribution of market-based instruments to climate governance has not 
enjoyed unanimous support and a small number of states, led by Bolivia, have 
strongly opposed such instruments: see Bodansky (n 12) 307.
132.  Torbjørg Jevnaker and Jørgen Wettestad, ‘Linked Carbon Markets: Silver Bullet, or 
Castle in the Air?’ (2016) 6(1–2) Climate Law 142, 150.
133.  Richard Kinley, ‘Climate Change after Paris: From Turning Point to Transformation’ 
(2017) 17(1) Climate Law 9, 11.
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government has unveiled plans for a national emissions trading scheme which 
is expected to launch in the second half of 2017.134 The implementation of such 
a scheme by the world’s largest carbon emitter could accelerate adoption rates 
globally for emissions trading schemes.135 Moreover, the deepening of China–EU 
dialogue concerning the EU ETS is also particularly positive.136 However, whilst 
of potentially huge significance, it is challenging to determine how a national 
Chinese scheme will look and operate in practice. Inevitably, this has meant 
that it is not possible to analyse the applicability of the core convergence crite-
ria elaborated in this article to what could yet emerge to be the most significant 
climate governance initiative to date. Yet the very real concern of potentially 
diverging design features reinforces the importance of (early) engagement and 
ideally consensual recognition that certain core convergence criteria must be 
shared by directly linked schemes. This does not mean that all emissions trading 
schemes must be identical. Indeed, as has been recognised elsewhere, it is prac-
tically impossible for two separate trading schemes to develop which treat their 
participants exactly equally in economic terms.137 Nonetheless, the integrity of 
any emerging global framework, particularly in the context of the evolution of 
a network of multilateral direct linkages,138 will only be as secure as the weakest 
participating scheme. As a result, fostering complementarity between different 
trading systems remains a fundamental challenge in developing a governance 
framework which recognises linkage as a prize worth pursuing.
The search for complementarity requires the identification and implemen-
tation of core convergence criteria and maintaining such compatibility, par-
ticularly as diverse climate governance initiatives develop, has emerged as a 
critical consideration for scholars and policy-makers. This article has advocated 
a threshold based on environmental integrity for the designation of a design 
feature as a core convergence criterion. Environmental integrity, consistent 
with the underlying instrumentalist rationale for deploying emissions trading, 
requires defining core convergence criteria to ensure that directly linked trading 
schemes could not lead to fewer emissions reductions than if each scheme con-
tinued to operate independently. Linkage by degrees is advanced as offering an 
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incrementalist pathway to secure the de minimis degree of alignment neces-
sary for successful direct linkage and, as such, it is prudent for policy-makers to 
start early with the establishment of frameworks and procedures to assess and 
promote the compatibility of critical design features.139
A key question in the search for durable climate governance arrangements 
focuses on whether a bottom-up system can advance, in an adequate manner, 
effective climate governance without a centralised institution.140 However, in 
the absence of such an internationally agreed architecture, this article has sug-
gested that it is both possible and desirable to advance convergence through 
linkage by degrees based on bilateral political and regulatory cooperation. 
There is little reason to think that such an approach, consistent with the core 
convergence criteria, would not provide a stable foundation for incremental 
institutional development, particularly since the prevailing realpolitik of cli-
mate change negotiations strongly suggests that ‘cap and trade will remain an 
aspect of the global response to climate change’.141
Incrementalist progress through the development and alignment of emis-
sions trading schemes may ultimately prove as important to the construction of 
effective and durable climate governance arrangements as multilateral nego-
tiations. Indeed, the World Trade Organisation and EU are recognised as suc-
cessful products of precisely such incrementalism.142 However, confidence in an 
incrementalist approach to climate governance need not replace the aspiration 
of progressing towards a comprehensive and binding global climate change 
agreement, but rather provide a critical counterpoint to the perspective that 
such a framework is likely to develop through a ‘big bang’ approach.143 There is 
instead a growing recognition that the path towards a global climate framework 
is not pre-determined and should not be confined to progress through multi-
lateral negotiations alone. Policies which inform and shape the construction 
of coherent governance architectures from separate and partial agreements, 
such as the refinement and implementation of core convergence criteria, better 
recognise the multi-speed reality of global climate action and may offer a more 
assured path towards a durable climate governance framework.
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